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I
INTRODUCTION
The appropriate role of mental health lawyers representing patient interests
has been the subject of vigorous commentary and debate for some time.' Some
authors have chastised lawyers opposing commitment proceedings for being too
lax, 2 while others have asserted that those lawyers are too aggressive and mechani-
cally adversary. 3 The role of mental health lawyers in law reform litigation has
also been seriously scrutinized.4
Curiously, however, discussions of advocacy in mental health law have rarely
touched on the appropriate role of attorneys representing commitment petitioners
or state hospitals. 5 This necessarily brief article attempts a modest redress of the
imbalance by sketching some concerns regarding the appropriate role of state
advocacy not in commitment hearings themselves, but in the limited yet impor-
tant context of post-commitment litigation involving arguably inappropriate
patient confinement.
"Arguably inappropriate patient confinement" is a rather imprecise designa-
tion. Included within it are cases in which, because of a possibly invalid court
order or a possibly unconstitutional statutory provision, it may be argued that the
specified nature or duration of a patient's confinement is not legally required or
permitted. The notion can perhaps best be captured by a series of representative
illustrations:
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1. A relevant commitment statute does not specifically authorize a commit-
ting court to designate a specific location where a committed patient is to be
housed. Arguably exceeding its authority, a court orders the state hospital to
"treat [the patient] in a maximum security setting."'6
2. In arguable violation of the relevant commitment statute and of the
patient's due process right to liberty, a committing court orders that a committed
patient be confined for "no less than 30 days."'7
3. Without explicit statutory authority, a committing court orders that a
civilly committed patient be retained at a mental health facility "until further
order of the court."8
4. An ambiguous state statute seems to authorize a juvenile court to dispense
with the stringent substantive and procedural requirements of the ordinary civil
commitment statute after an adjudication of delinquency. The court apparently
may apply far more flexible standards and procedures to hospitalize a juvenile in
the "disposition" phase of the juvenile proceeding. The juvenile court invokes the
more flexible route to commit an unadudicaed juvenile to the state hospital for
evaluation and treatment. 9
5. A challenged state law authorizes civilly committed patients to be released
as soon as the hospital deems release to be clinically warranted, but seems to
require, in arguable violation of due process and equal protection, that persons
committed after an insanity acquittal for a crime of violence spend at least ninety
days in confinement before becoming eligible even for conditional release.10
6. A statute requires that persons committed following an insanity acquittal
may be released, either unconditionally or conditionally, only with the concur-
rence of the court. Nonetheless, the court, believing it lacks the authority to grant
conditional release, denies a hospital's application for the conditional release of a
patient. 11
7. A statute, challenged on equal protection grounds, places authority for the
conditional or unconditional release of civilly committed patients solely in the
hands of the hospital, but requires the additional step of court approval for the
release of patients committed following an insanity acquittal.' 2
This article raises some questions and provides some suggestions regarding the
proper posture of state advocacy in the types of cases enumerated above. It is first
necessary, however, to describe some instances of state advocacy in that context.
6. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 123 Ariz. 298, 599 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1979).
7. State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980).
8. In re Guzan, 45 Pa. Commw. 525, 527-28, 405 A.2d 1036, 1037 (1979).
9. State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980).
10. People v. DeAnda, 114 Cal. App. 3d 480, 170 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1980); People v. Hurt, 90 Cal. App.
3d 974, 153 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1979). See also Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225, 228-29 (4th Cir. 1982); Benham
v. Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050, 1073 (N.D.Ga. 1980) (holding unconstitutional a statute restricting the
frequency of hospital-initiated requests for a patient's release).
11. Shuler v. United States, 422 A.2d 996 (D.C. 1980); see also Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
12. United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. dened, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977); United
States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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II
ILLUSTRATIONS OF STATE ADVOCACY
Of the seven examples provided above, only the last three-all involving per-
sons committed following an insanity acquittal-were patient-initiated challenges
to the commitment order or underlying statute.13 In each case, the state assumed
the traditional position adversary to the patient's release. Those three examples
warrant discussion.
In People v. Hurt, '4 the defendant was charged with aggravated assault. Fol-
lowing his acquittal on grounds of insanity, Hurt was committed to a state hospital
for a statutorily prescribed minimum stay of ninety days. The trial court believed
that the defendant, although not fully recovered, could have been treated success-
fully as an outpatient. The court read the statute, however, as precluding it from
ordering anything other than a ninety-day minimum institutional commitment.' 5
Hurt, who had apparently been free on bail during his trial, obtained a stay of
execution of the commitment order pending his appeal from that order.16
In the appellate court, Hurt urged a permissive rather than a mandatory inter-
pretation of the ninety-day institutional confinement provision. 17 In addition, his
counsel argued that "[t]o place appellant in a state hospital now, after he has
remained safely in the community during most of the pendency of his case at the
trial level and all of the pendency of his case at the appellate level, obviously
would not serve any legitimate or intended purpose of the law, nor would it meet
the constitutional mandate"' 8 of Jackson v. Indiana 19 that the nature and duration
of confinement must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose of
commitment. 20
Assuming an adversarial role, the state opposed both of Hurt's contentions.
Tracing the legislative history of the ninety-day commitment provision, the State
argued for a mandatory interpretation of the minimum confinement period.2 '
The state emphasized the "public's safety" 22 and the "uncertainty of psychiatric
13. Illustration 1 did not involve any court challenge concerning the issue posed in the text. Illustra-
tions 2-4 involved state-initiated challenges to the commitment orders, a procedure which will be discussed
tnfra. Not surprisingly, the patient-initiated challenges, Illustrations 5-7, involved persons who entered the
mental health system by way of the criminal justice system. Unlike their civilly committed counterparts,
such criminally committed patients often receive vigorous representation by appointed counsel even in the
appellate and post-commitment stages.
14. 90 Cal. App. 3d 974, 153 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1979).
15. Id. at 976, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 756. The statute, repealed in 1980, provided that defendants acquit-
ted by reason of insanity "shall" be confined unless fully recovered, and that defendants guilty of a felony
involving "death, great bodily injury," or an act presenting a "serious threat" to others must be confined
for 90 days. Id
16. See id at 977, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
17. Id. at 976, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
18. Id at 977, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
19. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
20. Id at 738.
21. See Brief for Respondent at 5-19, People v. Hurt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 974, 153 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1979).
This brief was prepared by the Criminal Division of the California Office of the Attorney General. The
legislative history indicated that discretion was intentionally given to the court only in cases involving
nonviolent crimes; confinement was intended to be mandatory where violent crimes were involved. 90 Cal.
App. 3d at 977, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
22. Brief for Respondent, supra note 21, at 22.
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prognosis ' 23 in arguing that a mandatory minimum inpatient evaluation period
did serve a legitimate purpose.24 The Hurt court, agreeing with the State, 25
affirmed the order of commitment.
People v. DeAnda26 is very similar to Hurt, although its legal nuances are some-
what more complex, and it is factually more favorable to the defendant patient.
The defendant, accused of assaulting his wife with a deadly weapon, suffered from
schizophrenia and perhaps from psychotic depression. After being acquitted by
reason of insanity, DeAnda was stabilized, as an outpatient, on antipsychotic med-
ication. In February 1980, more than a year after the assault, the California trial
court concluded a sanity hearing to determine whether DeAnda had "fully recov-
ered" his sanity or whether he had to undergo a ninety-day institutional
evaluation. 27
By then, the court had received psychiatric input from a number of experts.
Almost without exception, the psychiatrists agreed that the defendant did not need
"to be hospitalized but that he should continue his [outpatient] treatment with the
Mental Health Department, ' 2 that his psychosis was "in remission with appro-
priate medication," 29 that he was "not now psychotic"' 30 or dangerous, 3' that hos-
pitalization would be "very deleterious" 32 and that confinement would "halt the
progress that [was] being made. ' 33
The court believed that a defendant could not legally be considered "fully
recovered" if continued medication was necessary to maintain the defendant in a
state of remission. It felt statutorily obliged to order the unrecovered defendant
institutionalized for a ninety-day minimum evaluation period. The trial court
believed:
[that] it had no discretion to do otherwise; that it did not see "any useful purpose" in so
doing and was inclined to think such hospitalization would be "counter-productive;" and
that if the Legislature had granted the court discretion in the matter, it would have ordered
defendant to continue his treatment on an outpatient basis.
3 4
Like Hurt, DeAnda obtained a stay of the commitment order and perfected an
appeal. On appeal, DeAnda argued that psychopharmaceutical restoration to
sanity should be deemed full recovery (thus obviating the necessity for inpatient
confinement); that he was statutorily eligible for outpatient treatment without first
23. Id at 21.
24. Contrary to appellant's contention, until the medical director has had a minimum opportunity
for 'nstitutional observation and examination of appellant in order to intelligently form an opinion as to
whether he is a danger to the health and safety of others, the reasons for confining appellant have not
been satisfied.
Id at 21-22.
25. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 977, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 757. The court made specific reference to arguments in
respondent's brief. Id
26. 114 Cal. App. 3d 480, 170 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1980).
27. Id at 487, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
28. Id at 486, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
29. Id
30. id
31. id at 487, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
32. Id
33. d
34. Id at 488, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (appellate court reporting facts in proceeding below).
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undergoing a mandatory ninety-day institutional evaluation; and that a ninety-
day mandatory confinement period would violate his right to due process and
equal protection of the law.35
As in Hurt, the State argued forcibly against each of DeAnda's contentions.
The State's argument headings, as they appear in the table of contents of its brief,
capture the State's position:
I Appellant had not fully recovered his sanity within the meaning of Penal Code section
1026
II The trial court had no discretion to place appellant on outpatient status even though
the doctors thought outpatient treatment was preferable
III The order committing appellant to the state hospital for 90 days did not deprive
appellant of his right to due process of law
IV Due process of law is not violated by a mandatory hospital commitment even when
there is substantial evidence that outpatient treatment would be more appropriate
V The mandatory 90 day commitment for defendants acquitted of violent acts by reason
of insanity does not violate equal protection of the law
VI Principles of statutory construction require appellant to be committed for 90 days
prior to undergoing outpatient treatment
3 6
The appellate court in DeAnda, agreeing with each argument of the state, affirmed
the trial court's reluctant order of commitment in December 1980, some two years
after the then-psychotic defendant assaulted his wife.
Another example of state advocacy in operation is Shuler v. United States.37 In
Shuler, the appellant was charged in the District of Columbia with unarmed rob-
bery. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to St.
Elizabeth's Hospital, a public mental health facility in Washington, D.C. Later,
the hospital superintendent asked the court for Schuler's conditional release so that
the patient might spend the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays with his family.
The trial court denied the request as being beyond its authority and the patient
appealed.
Despite precedent indicating that the trial court had misconstrued its authority
to approve a conditional release38 and despite authority that construction of the
applicable conditional release statute "is not precluded by mootness," 39 the U.S.
attorney nonetheless raised mootness as its central argument in the appellate
court. 4° Given existing case law, however, the Shuler court reached the merits of
appellant's claim and held that the lower court did have the authority to grant the
requested conditional release. Accordingly, the order denying release was
vacated.4'
United States v. Ecker 42 one of the most complex instances of government advo-
cacy in cases of arguably inappropriate patient confinement, also arose in the Dis-
35. Id at 484, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
36. Brief for Respondent at i, People v. DeAnda, 114 Cal. App. 3d 480, 170 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1980). As
in Hurl, the state's brief was prepared by the Criminal Division of the California Attorney General's office.
37. 422 A.2d 996 (D.C. 1980).
38. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
39. Friend v. United States, 388 F.2d 579, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
40. Shuler, 422 A.2d at 997.
41. Id
42. 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
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trict of Columbia. 43 In 1968, Ecker was found not guilty by reason of insanity on
counts of rape and felony murder and was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital.
Five years later, the hospital sought court approval for Ecker's conditional release
in order to implement an optimal treatment plan for its patient. Under the plan,
Ecker would continue to live at the hospital but would have increased access to the
community to allow him to participate in a vocational training program. 44 Pur-
suant to standard procedure, the Office of the United States Attorney, which had
prosecuted Ecker, was notified of the hospital's conditional release request. 45
Because the Government objected to the proposed release, a court hearing was
held on the propriety of conditional discharge. 46
At the hearing, four mental health experts were called as witnesses. Although
each of them supported the hospital's proposed plan for conditional release, the
lower court denied the release application. Ecker appealed, contending that the
Government should bear the burden of proof when it opposes release and that a
conditional release scheme that is more onerous for insanity acquittees than for
civilly committed patients runs afoul of equal protection guarantees. The Govern-
ment argued against Ecker's release, voicing concern about public protection. In
fact, the Government asserted that Ecker did not satisfy the conditional release
requirement that he not be dangerous to himself or others47 and that, "contrary to
Ecker's argument, the Government does not bear the burden of proof on the dan-
gerousness issue when it opposes release, despite the hospital's certification. '48 The
District of Columbia Circuit, with one dissent, affirmed the lower court's denial of
the hospital's request for the patient's conditional release. 49
III
THE PROBLEM WITH STATE ADVOCACY IN INAPPROPRIATE
CONFINEMENT CASES
The illustrations discussed above provide an appropriate background for
assessing the state advocacy problem in cases of arguably inappropriate patient
confinement. The problem is a rather obvious one: in such cases, the state has
various, often inconsistent, interests at stake. There is a strong public protection
interest involved, which may be represented by the attorney general or depart-
ment of justice acting as the prosecutive arm of the state. Yet, the attorney general
is also counsel for the state department of health or its equivalent; and that depart-
ment and the state hospital may have a very different interest in these and related
cases.
43. For a discussion of state advocacy problems unique to the District of Columbia, see infra note 53.
44. An earlier hospital application for Ecker's conditional release had been denied by the trial court
and that decision affirmed on appeal. United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. 24 D.C. CODE § 301(e) (1973) (current version in 5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981)), set forth
in full inEcker, 543 F.2d at 183 n. 12.
46. 543 F.2d at 182.
47. 543 F.2d at 202 (Wright, J., dissenting); 5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981).
48. 543 F.2d at 202 (Wright, J., dissenting).
49. On the burden of proof question, each of the three judges expressed separate views, and there was
accordingly no opinion of the court on that issue.
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The hospital clearly has an interest in flexibility with regard to release deci-
sions. It does not wish to feed, clothe, house, and treat those who arguably do not,
in its professional judgment, belong in a state hospital setting. Being required to
care for patients who ought not be hospitalized is an economic drain, a diversion of
resources away from those who can most profit from them, and, in many respects,
simply a professional affront to mental health specialists employed by the state.
From a purely therapeutic perspective, decisions like Hurt, DeAnda, and Ecker
could be viewed by mental health professionals as statutorily or judicially man-
dated malpractice. It does not require much imagination or analytical skill to see
that many of the objections raised by psychiatrists to a patient's right to refuse
treatment could, by analogy, be readily applied to cases of inappropriate patient
confinement. When committed patients are allowed to refuse treatment, psychia-
trists object to "the needless suffering of the untreated patient, the impact of such
patients on the therapeutic milieu, the enormous waste of financial resources in
unutilized and underutilized hospital days, and the cumbersome legal procedures
that . . . add to costs and take staff time away from patient care."' 50 The same
results occur when persons who do not require inpatient treatment are nevertheless
required to be confined.
When only public protection interests are asserted by the state in litigation, the
legitimate state interests in effective treatment are thereby submerged. The sub-
mergence presents troublesome, but sometimes relatively invisible, consequences
for the state hospital. In view of decisions like Hurt and DeAnda, for example, it is
probable that state hospitals will unhappily but silently confine certain categories
of patients for ninety days, even if those patients are clinically ready for condi-
tional or unconditional release. The existence of such practices is evidenced by a
statement in the Policy and Procedure Manual of the Hawaii State Hospital,
which operates under a ninety-day mandatory minimum confinement statute sim-
ilar to the California provision sustained in Hurt and DeAnda. With respect to the
,preparation and filing of a hospital's application for release of a patient, the
manual states in bold print that "the appzcatzon, affidavit of the Clinical or Assis-
tant Clinical Director and the treating physician's Medical Report . can begener-
ated sufcenti*y prior to the expiration of the 90-day minimum, but may not be filed with the
court until the 90th day. ",51
Similarly, had the Government prevailed in Shuler,52 serious repercussions
might have ensued. If that case had been dismissed as moot without reaffirming
the authority of trial courts to' grant hospital and patient petitions for passes and
conditional release, St. Elizabeth's Hospital might have been repeatedly frustrated
in its attempt to employ an important and basic therapeutic tool.
The Ecker-type litigation is equally frustrating to hospital therapeutic interests.
A public institution, technically receiving legal representation from the Depart-
ment of Justice, petitioned for a patient's release, only to have the Department of
50. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 361 (1981).
51. Quoted in Wexler, Comments and Questions about Mental Health Law in Hawaii, HAWAII B.J., Winter
1978, at 3, 16.
52. Shuler v. United States, 422 A.2d 996 (D.C. 1980).
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Justice in its prosecutive role actively oppose the release in court. The apparent
conflict of interest did not escape the attention of Judge Wright, dissenting in
Ecker, who noted that "this puts the United States Attorney's office in the anoma-
lous position . . . of potentially being called upon to represent both sides--choos-
ing on its own to oppose the release, but being called upon to serve as lawyer for
the government hospital."'5 3
It is not always the case, however, that hospital interests in therapeutic
flexibility are submerged in litigation in favor of public protection interests. In
fact, research has uncovered a small number of cases where the state has challenged
a statute or court order on the grounds that the legislation or judicial order obliged
the hospital to confine a patient inappropriately. 54
Suppose, for example,55 that the state challenges the legitimacy of a court order
requiring it a) to "treat the patient in the maximum security unit," 56 or b) to
confine a patient for "no less than 30 days," or c) to hospitalize a civilly com-
mitted patient "until further order of the court," or d) to accept an unadjudicated
53. 543 F.2d at 203 (Wright, J. dissenting). I have noted a similar problem in Hawaii:
Interesting problems [may] seemingly arise in instances where a state properly initiates a release
application and presses it . . . despite a mixed reaction from the Sanity Commission, so that a court
hearing will eventuate . . . Since . . . the state has the right to apply for the patient's release, but
. . . the state has the burden in a court hearing to establish that the patient is not safe for release, the
"state" is put in a peculiar position.
Wexler, supra note 51, at 16.
The representation problem may be particularly pronounced in the District of Columbia, where the
United States Department of Justice serves as a local prosecutor as well as the lawyer for federal agencies,
including St. Elizabeth's Hospital, which is a unit within the Department of Health and Human Services.
Outside the District of Columbia, the state attorney general may represent the state hospital, and the
district attorney may serve as the local prosecutor. See Matter of Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262,
420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979). Nonetheless, since in most jurisdictions the attorney general, rather than the
district attorney, handles all appeals growing out of criminal cases, NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 156 (1977), the problem may resur-
face at the appellate level.
54. Cases discovered were State ex retl. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980); In
re Guzan, 45 Pa. Commw. 525, 405 A.2d 1036 (1979); Matter of Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262,
420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
55. These examples track Illustrations 1-4 noted in the Introduction and are suggested by the cases
cited in notes 6-9 supra. Factually and procedurally, the actual cases are to a large extent idiosyncratic and
untidy, and are accordingly employed here only to suggest the types of issues that might be raised in a
state-initiated challenge.
56. Although such orders are rarely challenged, an empirical study suggests just how troublesome
such orders can be to the administration of mental health services:
The [Arizona State Hospital's Special Classification Committee] is sometimes baffled by civil commit-
ment orders containing language to the effect that the patient is "to be held in the Maximum Security
Ward." A problem arises when the SCC is faced with a patient's request to transfer out of Maximum
Security and at the same time with a commitment order containing the above language. In such a
case the SCC does not know whether it is bound to follow the order-in which case it is easier to
discharge the patient than to change his ward--or whether the committing court has exceeded its
authority. . . . In any case, committing courts should refrain from attempting to tie the hospital's
hands with respect to the appropriate ward of confinement. This is particularly so in view of the fact
that few judges are sufficiently acquainted with the facilities of the hospital to recognize, for example,
that tight security is available not only in the Maximum Security Unit (Encanto Hall), but also in a
slightly less restrictive ward (Hermosa Hall), and that even the general population wards do not grant
grounds privileges to all patients.
Wexler & Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice. Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1,
219 n.30 (1971).
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juvenile for the purpose of evaluation and treatment. Surely, in each of those
instances, the state's desire to preserve its hospital's scarce resources and ther-
apeutic flexibility might lead it to initiate a challenge. In one case involving a
commitment order to confine a juvenile charged with delinquency for a specified
period of time, a petition filed by the state included as an exhibit an affidavit of a
staff psychiatrist which made explicit the state's interest in being able to discharge
the juvenile promptly. Among other things, the sworn statement specified:
1. That [the juvenile] is not suffering from a substantial disorder of emotional
processes, thought, cognition or memory; she is not mentally ill.
2. That [the juvenile] is not in need of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization and should
be discharged from the Arizona State Hospital.
3. That the Child/Adolescent Unit of ASH is presently filled to its 23-bed capacity
and that there are approximately five mentally ill children awaiting placement on said unit
by the Department of Economic Security, their parents and/or the Superior Courts of the
State of Arizona.
4. That [the juvenile's] continued placement at ASH will not benefit her current
problems and needs and may in fact have a serious detrimental affect [sic] upon her mental
health.
5. That [the juvenile] is occupying a bed which could presently be used by at least five
children needing mental health care.
6. That [the juvenile's] presence at the ASH is taking professional staff time away from
the other.patients on the Child/Adolescent Unit, to their detriment.
5 7
Why is it that the state sometimes argues forcefully against the propriety of
such matters as mandatory minimum confinement periods58 and the requirement
of court approval for release, 59 and at other times, as in Hurt, DeAnda, Shuler, and
Ecker, actively supports such requirements? In general, it seems that the state is far
more likely to assert its public protection interest when a patient has been chan-
nelled into the mental health system through a criminal charge, especially when
the charge was a serious one. That may explain the state's stance in Hurt, DeAnda,
Shuler, and Ecker. Yet, even among criminal cases resulting in mental health com-
mitment, there are some notable exceptions. In Matter of Torsney, 6 for example, a
police officer charged with murdering a fifteen-year old youth was committed after
successfully interposing an insanity defense based on psychomotor epilepsy.
Shortly thereafter, the state commissioner of mental hygiene, claiming Torsney
was neither dangerous nor mentally ill, applied for a court order authorizing Tor-
sney's release, and successfully pursued the case through the appellate level. 6 1
57. The affidavit was included in a petition filed originally in the intermediate appellate court and
ultimately transmitted to the Supreme Court of Arizona in connection with State cx rel Dandoy v. Supe-
rior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980). In the text, pertinent paragraphs from different portions of
the affidavit have, for the sake of convenience and readability, been brought together and renumbered.
58. See State ex re. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980).
59. See In re Guzan, 45 Pa. Commw: 525, 405 A.2d 1036 (1979).
60. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
61. In Torsny, however, the prosecutive interest was vigorously pressed by the District Attorney's
office, which opposed the release. Id at 671, 394 N.E.2d at 264, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 194. For an example of a
state-initiated action opposing hospitalization of a juvenile charged with three acts of delinquency, see
State ex re. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980). Dandoy was a special action
brought by the State, on relation of the Director of the Department of Health, against the committing
court. The Attorney General represented the Director and the County Attorney represented the respon-
dent court. Since hospitalization was ordered upon a request for psychiatric examination made by the
juvenile's counsel, the juvenile real party in interest-represented by t.he Public Defender-opposed the
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Moreover, even if a state distinguished sharply between criminal commit-
ments62 and civil commitments, taking a prosecutive posture with the former cate-
gory and a more therapeutic posture with the latter category, such a policy
decision would be far from satisfactory. Should a state adhere to a purely prosecu-
tive perspective even after a criminally committed patient has been confined for
many years? Is a pure public protection rationale justified even for criminally
committed patients involved in nonviolent criminal activity?63 What reason, other
than habit or tradition, can be given for advancing a greater public protection
interest in a nonviolent criminal commitment case than in the modern variety civil
commitment case?
Civil commitment cases are increasingly being tried by public prosecutors
64
and typically allege not only a patient's mental illness, but also the patient's dan-
gerousness as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt, or threat. 65 If a court in a
civil commitment case orders that a patient be confined in a maximum security
unit, or that the patient be confined for a specified minimum period or until fur-
ther order of the court, the court's order may well reflect a judicial concern about
the patient's dangerousness and the public's protection. That concern, moreover,
may have originated with the prosecuting attorney who tried the case.
In short, it does not appear that the state's public protection and therapeutic
interests are being advanced under a scheme defendable as a coherent policy of
appropriate advocacy in mental health cases. It would not be surprising to learn
that any given state advocacy stance is determined in practice largely by proce-
dural factors and happenstance-such as whether a particular case falls adminis-
tratively within the purview of the criminal division of the attorney general's
office. Mental health law has always been plagued by confusion between police
power and therapeutic interests,66 and it is evident that the confusion has not
escaped the realm of state advocacy.
release. For a somewhat similar situation involving a commitment order for a mentally retarded juvenile
and a successful opposition to that order by the Attorney General on behalf of the State Department of
Mental Retardation, see In re Maricopa County Appeal, 15 Ariz. App. 536, 489 P.2d 1238 (1971).
62. The term "criminal commitment" is a rough one, used to describe cases in the mental health
system that have some connection to the criminal justice system (e.g., insanity acquittees, persons found
incompetent to stand trial, and sexual psychopaths). See D. WEXLER, supra note 1, at 117-33.
63. A recent report drew a distinction between violent and nonviolent insanity acquittees, and sug-
gested that court approval be required as a condition for release only with respect to the former category.
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE ACQUITrED
DEFENDANT 37 (1979). Evidently, the Association thought public protection interests warranted judicial
scrutiny of release only in certain criminal commitment settings. For a discussion of the view that a
requirement of judicial release approval may, in the aggregate, hasten rather than retard the release of
criminally committed and dangerous civilly committed patients, see D. WEXLER, supra note 1, at 122-27.
64. For a discussion of public prosecutors in civil commitment cases, see In re Kossow, 292 A.2d 97
(D.C. 1978); Wexler, Kicttmology and Mental Health Law. An Agenda, 66 VA. L. REv. 681, 707-11 (1980). See
also THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 5, at 69 (discussing need for counsel
to represent the state in commitment cases).
65. D. WEXLER, supra note 1, at 37.
66. Since these commitment procedures include actions premised on remedial and care-giving (i.e.,
parens patriae) functions of the State, as well as those concerned essentially and primarily with protec-
tion of the community (viz, police power functions), a number of critical public policy, legal, and
programmatic issues continue to be rather thoroughly confounded.
Shah, Foreword to D. WEXLER, CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: LEGAL
ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT, AND RELEASE at vi (1976).
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SOME SUGGESTIONS
The primary purpose of this article is to expose the state advocacy problem,
not to solve it. Once the problem is laid bare and the legal and mental health
actors in the system are forced to direct their attention to it, their reformative
suggestions, grounded in experience and knowledge of local nuances and intrica-
cies, will be as valuable as the ones made here. Moreover, given the wide variation
among jurisdictions in such basic matters as the processing of commitment cases,6 7
the structure of state legal services, 68 and the role of the state attorney general's
office69 and its relationship to agency counsel and to local prosecutors, an action
that may constitute workable reform in one state may violate another state's con-
stitution. The suggestions made here are often cast in somewhat general terms and
must be viewed within the constraints of the caveats just noted. They often take
the form of structural frameworks and procedural options rather than resolutions
on substantive matters.
A. Communication
The first step in formulating a sensible advocacy position is to insure that the
attorney general is aware of the various state interests at stake. Constant communi-
cation between the attorney general's office and the state department of mental
health (and its state hospitals) is thus essential. Where the department has its own
house counsel, 70 counsel is in the best position to coordinate communication. In
the absence of house counsel, the attorney general should periodically send a
deputy into the field to consult with department and hospital administrators and
staff in order to learn of frustrations and concerns. In turn, state administrators
must utilize increased opportunities for communication to express concerns over
legal mandates which lead to arguably inappropriate confinement, rather than
suffering silently over such rulings. In short, they should express the state's interest
in treating only those persons who truly require confinement. Until effort is
expended to establish this two-way communication, there is little hope of altering
the course of state advocacy.7 ' Once the attorney general has been notified of
particular concerns, various means for legal expression exist. The posture of real
or potential litigation will help determine the expression in any given case.
67. Variation even exists, for example, on whether a commitment petitioner is represented by counsel
in commitment cases and, if so, whet er the case for commitment may be pressed by private counsel or
only by a public prosecutor. See sources cited supra note 64.
68. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE STRUCTURE OF STATE LEGAL SERVICES (1979).
69. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW POWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL (1977); NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL supra note 53.
70. Whether departments or agencies may employ their own counsel is a matter of wide variation
among the states. NAT'L ASs'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 68, at 20-38. In states which do
employ agency counsel, there is a wide range of possible relationships between agency counsel and the
attorney general. Id at 51-56.
71. A good example of expressed concerns that did alter the course of state advocacy is State ex rel.
Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980).
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B. Response to Patient-Initiated Petition
Consider cases in which a patient is pressing an argument of inappropriate
confinement. The attorney general might, in a case like DeAnda, soften its stance
regarding the statutory availability of outpatient treatment or the question of
whether a patient might be deemed legally recovered if the patient's mental func-
tioning is restored by psychopharmacological means. 72 In a case like Shuler,
involving the ability of a commitment court to authorize passes and conditional
releases, the government might simply confess error, given the hospital's interests
and the precedents on point. 73  Even if the attorney general does not wish to
present the hospital's view for public protection reasons, he should consider
authorizing the hospital to seek participation in the litigation through its house
counsel or through the appointment of special counsel, 74 perhaps in an amicus
capacity. 75
72. Compare the actual position taken by the State in DeAnda; see supra text accompanying note 36.
73. Although confessions of error are typically resorted to in the context of criminal cases, Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 (1942), they are also available in civil
litigation. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951) (per curiam);
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980); Atkins v. United States,
556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). The confession of error doctrine is also
recognized by state courts. In re D.P., 556 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1976) (per curiam) (juvenile proceeding);
Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968) (sexual psychopath
commitment).
74. All attorneys general have the authority to appoint special counsel, and often do so in cases
involving a conflict of representation. NAT'L ASS'N OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 68, at 42. In some
instances of inter-agency conflict, the attorney general, acting through two assistants operating indepen-
dently, will represent both of the parties to a lawsuit. State ex ret Conway v. Hunt, 59 Ariz. 256, 126 P.2d
303, vacatedon rehearing on other grounds, 59 Ariz. 312, 127 P.2d 130 (1942). On somewhat related matters, see
Stern, "Inconsistenc" in Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1951); Note,judicial Resolution of Inter-
Agency Legal Disputes, 89 YALE L.J. 1595 (1980).
Depending largely upon whether the attorney general is regarded as retaining his common law powers,
jurisdictions differ substantially in the extent to which they view the attorney general as being primarily a
lawyer for state agencies or as being primarily responsible for representing the public interest. Compare
Santa Rita Mining Co. v. Department of Property Valuation, Ill Ariz. 368, 371, 530 P.2d 360, 363 (1975)
("The Attorney General is the attorney for the Agency, no more. In the instant case the Attorney General
did not have the power to appeal against the wishes of his client.") and Arizona State Land Dep't. v.
McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 143, 348 P.2d 912, 915 (1960) ("RIThe fundamental obligation of the Attorney Gen-
eral is to act as legal advisor to the official agencies of the State. The legal services of his Department must
be furnished whenever required by a department of the State even in situations where the Attorney Gen-
eral may not agree with the policies pursued by the particular department.") with Secretary of Admin.
and Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 163, 326 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1975) ("The Attorney General repre-
sents the Commonwealth as well as the Secretary, agency or department head who requests his appear-
ance. . . . He also has a common law duty to represent the public interest. . . . Thus, when an agency
head recommends a course of action, the Attorney General must consider the ramifications of that action
on the interests of the Commonwealth and the public generally, as well as on the official himself and his
agency.") and Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977) (where appeal, in the
attorney general's judgment, would further interests of the state and public, he may present appeal over
express objections of state office he represented in court below). See also D'Amico v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
75. Whether one is permitted to appear as an amicus is within the discretion of the court, Matthews v.
Ingleside Hosp., Inc., 21 Ohio Misc. 116, 254 N.E.2d 923 (1969), and in cases involving issues of public
interest, amicus assistance is often needed and the request of an amicus to appear is generally granted. Id.
The attorney general and interested state agencies have been permitted to appear as amicus curiae.
Carden v. Johnson, 282 Or. 169, 577 P.2d 513 (1978). The principal restriction on the role of an amicus is
that it may not raise questions not raised by the parties. Mears v. Little Rock School Dist., 593 S.W.2d 42
(Ark. 1980); State ex re. Dept. of Health and Environ. Sciences v. Lasorte, 596 P.2d 477 (Mont. 1979). It
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C. State Initiated Challenges
If a case alleging inappropriate patient confinement is not ongoing as a result
of a patient-initiated petition, a state hospital administrator or house counsel may
persuade the attorney general to initiate a suit on behalf of the state. Such a suit
may allege, for example, the invalidity of a court order requiring the hospital to
confine a patient in a certain location or for a certain minimum stay. Such state-
initiated suits, although possible, 76 have been infrequent, perhaps because hospital
interests have not been effectively communicated to the attorney general.
Structures can be devised to insure that state-initiated suits challenging court
orders that restrict a hospital's therapeutic flexibility can be brought without con-
cealing or sacrificing possible interests in public protection. If, for example, the
challenge is brought against the committing court as a special action or extraordi-
nary writ in the nature of mandamus or prohibition, 77 the court should have an
interest in its order sufficient to request the county or district attorney to argue in
support of the order.78 The district attorney's interest and incentive in upholding
the order will be especially strong in jurisdictions in which commitment cases are
themselves brought by public prosecutors.
79
In many instances, a state-initiated suit may seek simply to obtain an interpre-
tation of a state statute and the resulting obligations of a hospital. Illustrative
issues are as follows: Under an applicable statute, does the committing court have
the right to require a hospital to house a patient in the maximum security unit?80
Does the statute give the court a right to require that a patient be held for a
minimum time period?8 I Does the statute authorize a hospital to release a patient
on the hospital's own initiative, or may a court require court approval before a
patient may be released? 2 Is the court authorized by statute to grant passes or
conditional releases?8 3
Sometimes, however, a challenge may involve more than simply a question of
statutory interpretation. In cases like Hurt, DeAnda, and Ecker, constitutional ques-
tions were also presented. If a statute does in fact require a hospital to confine
may, however, be permitted to argue existing issues according to its own theories. Keating v. State, 157 So.
2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
In cases of arguably inappropriate patient confinement, it might also be helpful to have organizations
of mental health professionals, or of state hospital administrators, such as the American Association of
State Mental Health Program Directors, appear in an amicus capacity.
76. State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980); In re Guzan, 45 Pa.
Commw. 525, 405 A.2d 1036 (1979).
77. State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980); 17A ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. RULES OF PROC. FOR SPECIAL ACTIONS, l(a) (1973 & Supp. 1981); 7A COLO. REV. STAT. R. Civ.
PROC. 106 (1973 & Supp. 1981); 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 7801 (McKinney 1980). See Lesher, Extraordi-
nary Writs in the Appellate Courts of Arizona, 7 ARiz. L. REV. 34 (1965).
78. Fenton v. Howard, 118 Ariz. 119, 121, 575 P.2d 318, 320 (1978). Fenton, however, holds only that a
county attorney may represent a respondent judge, not that he must do so. Id.
79. See sources cited supra note 64. In State ex ret. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d
12 (1980), the county attorney, who represents petitioning agencies in commitment cases, appeared in the
appellate courts in support of the commitment court's order. Id. at 185, 619 P.2d at 13.
80. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 123 Ariz. 298, 599 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1979).
81. State ex reZ Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 619 P.2d 12 (1980).
82. In re Guzan, 45 Pa. Commw. 525, 405 A.2d 1036 (1979).
83. Shuler v. United States, 422 A.2d 996 (D.C. 1980).
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certain patients for a mandatory minimum, ninety-day stay, does that provision
violate due process or equal protection? If a statute authorizes civilly committed
patients to be released on the hospital's own initiative but requires court approval
for the release of criminally committed patients, does the statute deny criminally
committed patients equal protection of the law?
Hurt, DeAnda, and Ecker, however, dealt with constitutional questions raised by
patients themselves. Could the same issues have originated in a state-initiated
challenge? That inquiry raises the question whether an attorney general, or a state
agency represented by the attorney general, may assert the unconstitutionality of a
state statute.
Jurisdictions vary remarkably on the issue; their positions virtually cover the
gamut. Some courts have suggested that an attorney general would be "derelict in
his duty" if he did not vigorously defend the constitutionality of a state statute.8 4
Other courts view an attorney general's challenge to the constitutionality of legis-
lation as curious,8 5 while still others see such behavior as perfectly permissible. 6
Finally, one court has stated that the attorney general may even have the "duty"
to initiate an action to determine the validity of a law he believes is
unconstitutional.8 7
Apart from the question of the powers of the attorney general himself, there is
the question of the right of state agencies and public officials, who are represented
by the attorney general, to assert the unconstitutionality of state statutes. Even
jurisdictions which generally adhere to the principle that public officials charged
with administering a law are prohibited from challenging its constitutionality
often craft exceptions to the rule when the issue involved is considered to be one of
"substantial public interest."88 Leeway to challenge the constitutionality of state
84. White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 247, 81 N.W.2d 725, 729 (1957); see City of
Kenosha v. Dosemagen, 54 Wis. 2d 269, 271, 195 N.W.2d 462, 464 (1972).
85. Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 145, 348 P.2d 912, 916 (1960); cf. Baxley v.
Rutland, 409 F. Supp. 1249, 1255, 1257, (M.D. Ala. 1976) (since legislation may require attorney general
to defend the very type of case he now seeks to prosecute, action by state attacking the validity of its own
statutes in federal court seems "incongruous").
86. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 820, 199 N.W.2d 738, 739 (1972); Commonwealth ex
rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865,868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) ("[i]f the Constitution is threatened by an
item of legislation, the Attorney General may rise to the defense of the Constitution by bringing a suit
87. Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. 501, 511, 311 A.2d 162, 167 (1973); see also NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-215 (1978):
When the Attorney General issues a written opinion that an act of the Legislature is unconstitu-
tional and any state officer charged with the duty of implementing the act, in reliance on such
opinion, refuses to implement the act, the Attorney General shall, within ten working days of the
issuance of the opinion, file an action in the appropriate court to determine the validity of the act. In
any such action filed under the provisions of this section, the Attorney General may sue as defendant
any person having a litigable interest in the matter or in lieu thereof may sue the Secretary of State. If
the Secretary of State is named as defendant, it shall be his duty to defend such action and to support
the constitutionality of the act of the Legislature and for such purpose is authorized to employ special
counsel.
88. Neeland v. Clearwater Memorial Hosp., 257 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. 1977); see also Federal
Express Corp. v. Skelton, 265 Ark. 187, 193, 578 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1979) (issues involving "public interest");
Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 467, 229 S.E.2d 718, 719
(1976) (per curiam) (issues of "wide concern"); City of Madison v. Ayers, 85 Wis. 2d 540, 545, 271 N.W.2d
101, 103 (1978) (issues of "great public concern").
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statutes is often accorded on public interest grounds if a state agency finds itself in
a situation of conflicting obligations because of the law.8 9 Furthermore, state
departments are sometimes allowed to press such suits if it seems unlikely that the
issue would otherwise be raised.90
Cases involving constitutional issues of inappropriate patient confinement may
well fall within the public interest exception. In addition, state hospitals may
often find themselves subject to conflicting obligations because of possibly uncon-
stitutional laws. If the arguably unconstitutional statute or order of the commit-
ting court is followed, state hospitals may be forced to neglect their obligations to
act in the best interests of their patients and to release them when confinement
seems no longer warranted. 9' On the other hand, if the hospital discharges a
patient on clinical grounds despite a court order requiring it to hold the patient,
the hospital places itself in legal jeopardy.9 2
Moreover, inappropriate confinement cases involving constitutional issues may
easily be viewed as appropriate ones for state-initiated challenge under the doc-
trine that, if a state suit is disallowed, the important issue at stake may go unliti-
gated.93 In Johnson v. Avert,94 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
insuring that indigent and uneducated prison inmates have access to the courts on
constitutional claims. It held that a prison that did not otherwise make provisions
to insure inmates access to the courts could not prohibit jailhouse lawyers from
rendering legal assistance to fellow inmates. Especially in days of decreasing
funding for patient legal assistance programs, 95Johnson should stand as formidable
authority for the proposition that, unless a state is permitted to assert unconstitu-
tional patient confinement, a largely indigent, uneducated, and lawyerless popula-
tion of involuntarily committed mental patients will be denied access to the courts
89. Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 167 S.C. 463, 467, 229 S.E.2d
718, 720 (1976) (per curiam); see also City of Madison v. Ayers, 85 Wis.2d 540, 545, 271 N.W.2d 101, 103
(1978); cf Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91, 99 (8th Cir. 1956) (state officials, under constitutional
duty to integrate schools, have federal constitutional right to be free from interference with their duty, and
may bring injunctive action in federal court to prohibit further obstruction).
90. City of Madison v. Ayers, 85 Wis. 2d 540, 545, 271 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1978).
91. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("[E]ven if [the patient's] involuntary confine-
ment was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed.");
Parham v. JR., 422 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (if medical standards for admission are not met, hospital must
have authority to refuse to admit a child volunteered for admission). Furthermore, if the hospital complies
with an arguably unconstitutional order, it will be frustrated in its obviously "significant interest in con-
fining the use of its costly mental health facilities to cases of genuine need." Id at 604-05. Finally, such
orders arguably interfere with the constitutional rights of mental health professionals to properly engage in
their profession. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (leaving open question of infringement of
doctor's constitutional right to practice medicine).
92. Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (civil suit against hospital by mother of
victim killed by patient who was released from hospital in violation of court order); Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v.
Riviere, 597 S.W.2d 596 (Ark. 1980) (petition for contempt denied).
93. See supra text accompanying note 89.
94. 393 U.S. 483 (1969); accord Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (Johnson holding applies to
civil rights claims as well as to habeas corpus actions).
95. On the need for patient advocacy, see Task Panel, President's Commission on Mental Health,
Mental Health and Hwnan Rights.- Report oftMe Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 49, 54-63
(1978). For a description and analysis of some foundation-funded or university-affiliated programs for
bringing legal services to mental hospital patients, see Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 A. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 21.
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in matters of considerable constitutional concern.96
V
CONCLUSION
Questions of patient advocacy in mental health law and questions of public
protection and therapeutic justifications for commitment have traditionally inter-
ested mental health law scholars and practitioners. Those same questions in the
context of state advocacy, however, have gone completely unaddressed. In this
article, some problems and inconsistencies in approaches to state advocacy have
been identified. Some general suggestions for reform have been made, keeping in
mind the severe constraints which often flow from local law and from the structure
of state governments and state legal services. Real reform will be possible, how-
96. Conceptually, the law regarding the capacity of state officials to challenge the federal constitution-
ality of state statutes seems to be a state court public litigation counterpart to what is known in private
federal litigation as the standing of a private litigant to assert constitutional jus tertii, the constitutional
rights of third parties. On jus tertii generally, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 102-09
(1978); Sedler, Standing to Assert ConstitutionalJus Terti 'in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note,
Standing to Assert ConstitutionalJus Tert'i, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
When a state is granted standing to challenge the federal constitutionality of a state statute, as in
Thompson v. South Carolina Comm'n on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E.2d 718 (1976)
(per curiam) (equal protection challenge), it is obviously asserting a constitutional violation not of the
state's rights, but of the rights of some state citizens. See also Neeland v. Clearwater Memorial Hosp., 257
N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. 1977) (allowing public official to challenge constitutionality "would in effect
permit him to assert private rights of third parties"); cf. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199
N.W.2d 738 (1972) (where jurisdiction views attorney general as representing public interest, he may bring
suit in name of state challenging constitutionality of legislation, and general rule prohibiting the assertion
ofjus tertii would not apply in such suits). But cf Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956)
(rather unusual case relying in part on traditional jus tertii cases and holding state officials have federal
constitutional right to be free from interference in carrying out their constitutional obligations to others).
The exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the assertion of jus tertii constitutional rights seem to
parallel the exceptions to the rule prohibiting public officials from attacking the federal constitutionality of
state legislation. Thus, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court allowed a vendor of 3.2% beer to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the sale of the beer to males under 21 and to females
under 18. Id at 192-97. The vendor was injured in fact by the statute and was placed in a conflicting
position because of it. Id at 194. She could either acquiesce in it and suffer financial loss by not selling to
males aged 18-21 or she could disobey the statute and suffer possible sanctions. Id Moreover, if she acqui-
esced or could not raise the rights of would-be male consumers aged 18-21, the absent 18-21 year old males
could suffer a denial of their equal protection rights. Id at 195-97. Accordingly, she was permitted to
argue that the statute deprived males aged 18-21 of equal protection of the law. d. at 197. State hospitals,
which may be viewed as vendors (albeit sometimes to "compulsory consumers") of mental health services,
are placed in a comparable, conflicting position by instances of inappropriate patient confinement. If they
violate a court order or statute, they may be subject to sanction. If they acquiesce in it, they will suffer a
drain on resources and the constitutional rights of their patients may be diluted.
In jus tertii cases, the courts are very much concerned with the factual ability or inability of third
parties to assert their own rights, and are often receptive to jus tertii standing when one in a close profes-
sional relationship to third parties raises third party claims that the third parties themselves are unlikely to
be able to assert. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (plurality opinion permitting physician
plaintiffs to raise the rights of women who sought abortions); Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 512 F.
Supp. 316 (D.R.I. 1981) (medical facility allowed to assert constitutional rights of women seeking abor-
tions). Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), cited in the text for the proposition that prisoners--and a
fortiori mental patients--are unlikely to assert their constitutional rights absent assistance, is actually a.jus
tertii case. There, a jailhouse lawyer, disciplined for violating a prison regulation prohibiting inter-inmate
legal assistance, was able to argue that the regulation unconstitutionally impeded other inmates in litigating
their constitutional claims. The similarity of a mental hospital-patient situation to the situations in Sin-
gleton and Johnson seems apparent.
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ever, only if the issues are examined in the context of individual jurisdictions. Per-
haps attorneys general, counsel to state departments of health, hospital
administrators, and legal scholars will be prompted to explore the questions in the
laboratories provided by local law.

